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INTRODUCTION
In the literature on the uniform UN sales law (CISG), the decisions in the
first and second instances of the Zapata1 case triggered an extraordinarily
lively discussion.2  Simply stated, the case concerned the delivery of painted
cookie tins used for packaging Christmas cookies, for which the American
buyer (i.e., place of business in the USA), citing flimsy pretexts, refused to
pay.  The Mexican seller (i.e., place of business in Mexico), sued and was
awarded compensatory damages; as part of the damages, the trial court also
awarded the plaintiff its attorneys’ fees.  At the appellate level, where only the
issue of attorneys’ fees was disputed, the appellate court rejected the claim for
reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and reversed the trial court decision.  [The
seller’s] appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court by writ of certiorari was denied.3
The cases concerned the so-called “American rule,” according to which the
parties each bear their own litigation expenses, and in particular their own
attorneys’ fees, independent of the outcome of the case.  This deviates from
German legal understanding and has significant practical consequences.  In
particular, high attorneys’ fees could lead to the result that the compensatory
damages awarded to the plaintiff in actuality fall far short of covering his
losses, and for the victorious defendant winning a case can be a pyrrhic
victory.  Yet, the American rule is not without exceptions, and especially for
abusive lawsuits brought on obviously groundless claims, American
procedural law permits the losing party bringing such claims to be partially
burdened with the cost.4  Also in cases of especially serious breach of
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contract, an award of punitive damages could make it possible for the
victorious plaintiff to recover his litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees.
Nevertheless, in the large majority of cases the American rule leads to the
described results, which for German jurists appear at first glance surprising
and unacceptable.  Especially for foreign parties to a contract who come
before an American court and win, the American rule can lead to unpleasant
surprises.
The decision of the appellate court was drafted by the noted judge and
legal scholar Richard Posner.  Judge Posner based his rejection of the
recoverability of litigation expenses and attorneys’ fees on the following
arguments, given here in shortened and simplified form:  First, the issue is a
procedural question which is to be judged according to the lex fori and not
according to the CISG.  Second, if these costs are considered to be part of the
damages claimed by the injured plaintiff, it would only be possible to award
them to one side, namely in favor of the plaintiff entitled to damages; in
contrast, the defendant who successfully defended the suit would have to bear
the costs himself.  Third, the legislators of the states that ratified the CISG did
not envisage such a meaning for the damages norms of Arts. 74 et seq.  CISG,
and had the American legislators envisaged it they presumably would have
abstained from signing the CISG rather than “abandon the hallowed American
rule.”
I.  PARTICULAR POSITION OF THE AMERICAN RULE
A comprehensive and impressive comparative law analysis by John
Gotanda5 shows worldwide a large variety of solutions to the problem of
litigation costs and attorneys’ fees, as well as the particular position of the
American rule.  Generally, the following positions are distinguishable:
1.  The large majority of legal systems follow the principle that the
winning party is either fully, or at least partially, reimbursed for costs incurred
from the proceedings.6  However, there are significant differences with regard
to the various types of costs, as well as the extent of (reimbursable) litigation
costs and attorneys’ fees.  In determining the reimbursable costs variables
include:  the amount in controversy, the degree to which the claim was
successful, possible delay in proceedings by a party and its general conduct,
and (also) the complexity of the questions to be decided.  Although requiring
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the losing party to bear the costs may originally have had a punitive character,
today it is only for ensuring compensation to the winning party.7  In the
European legal systems, including that of the common law, applicable
procedural rules mainly shift the costs to the losing party in both state-run
judicial proceedings [those provided for by the state] and arbitration.  For
state-run judicial proceedings the cost-bearing requirement is mostly regulated
in procedural laws.8  Although in arbitrations the parties are often first given
the opportunity to come to an agreement over cost allocation, mostly however,
and where such an agreement is lacking, the arbitral tribunal is allowed more
or less broad discretion concerning the allocation of costs, which in most cases
is apparently exercised according to the rule “costs follow the event.”9
2.  In the United States however, as previously mentioned, according to
the American rule legal costs are generally not permitted to be shifted; in
practice at issue are especially the attorneys’ fees of the winning party.10  The
American rule is justified with the argument that the outcome of a trial often
resembles a game of chance and shifting the costs would therefore unfairly
penalize the losing party.  Moreover, it is feared that the risk (if one loses) of
being required to also bear the costs of the opposing party would prevent
potential plaintiffs “from instituting actions to vindicate their rights.”  Finally,
it is said that claims for costs and attorneys’ fees would cause additional
evidence difficulties and impede “the administration of justice.”11  Of course,
there are significant exceptions to this rule, and in arbitration proceedings the
arbitrators frequently also have the authority to allocate the costs and/or
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attorneys’ fees, whereby the outcome of the proceedings is taken into
consideration.12
3.  However, one must distinguish the allocation of legal costs (including
attorneys’ fees) which is undertaken by a court or arbitration tribunal in its
decision (or supplementary decision) within the context of legal proceedings
from the indirect shifting of costs as damages; if a party incurs legal costs
from trial or arbitration caused by a third party, in limited circumstances
recourse may be sought against the contracting party by claiming those costs
as damages:  if the buyer became entangled in litigation with his customers
due to defective goods, then as long as it was foreseeable he can
generally—meaning insofar as not excluded under rules limiting damages
such as the foreseeability rule in Art. 74 CISG—claim reimbursement for the
costs of such litigation from the seller according to general rules of liability
for breach of contract, despite the fact that they initially originated as legal
costs.  In addition, costs that arose before the initiation of legal proceedings
may likely also be recovered as damages within the scope of application of the
American rule.13  Finally, in cases of especially reprehensible breach of
contract the possible award of punitive damages for the victorious plaintiff can
result in covering his legal costs.
II.  RIGHT AND REALITY OF THE UNIFICATION OF LAW
A.  Outer Boundaries of Unified Sales Law:  Procedural Law v. Substantive
Law
Uniform sales law attempts to fix its outer boundaries—i.e., its sphere of
application—in Arts. 1-5 CISG, but the necessary classification of the legal
institutions considered in an actual case repeatedly leads to doubts.  Well-
known are the problems of classifying mistakes as to the characteristics of the
goods or the obligor’s ability to perform as validity rules reserved for
domestic law, or questions of the seller’s liability or the suspension of
performance due to anticipatory breach (Unsicherheitseinrede) unified in the
CISG, but also the dividing line between public law and unified sales law in
procurement by regional authorities, or also the boundary between procedural
and substantive law, such as in the determination of the burden of proof or the
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agreement on jurisdiction14 and arbitration clauses.  This last boundary in
particular is often fixed according to historically-based national
preconceptions that have been reinforced over generations through professors
and university curricula.  Merely because the rules concerning cost-bearing for
litigation costs and/or attorney’s fees contained in domestic civil procedure
codes are classified as “procedural laws” should not obscure regard for the
compensatory character of such rules; this is shown by the recourse cases
mentioned above, in which the legal costs are recovered as claimed damages
[from the contracting party/primary obligor], and by the clear reliance on
damages principles such as consideration of a successful party’s joint-
responsibility for the origination and scope of such costs.15  In international
cases at least, without an international uniform classification the
categorization of a question as substantive or procedural can at best be a legal
façon de parler [way of speaking] for a demarcation based on aspects of the
case, but it cannot answer the substantive issue itself.
B.  Legal Costs as an Excerpt from the Law Concerning Damages
Not only common sense, but also the above-mentioned possibilities to
recover legal costs through recourse proceedings, or the recognition of a
substantive compensation claim independent of procedural claims for
reimbursement,16 suggest that legal costs, at least those stemming from
contractual disputes (in the broadest sense), represent a loss for the party that
must litigate a claim since—as and to the extent such a party’s success in the
action shows—the other party did not fulfill (or at least did not correctly
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fulfill) their contract.  However, it is questionable whether these “special
damages”17  and their recoverability are in fact uniformly regulated on the
basis of Arts. 74-76, 77 CISG (or should be resolved uniformly through
interpretation of these provisions on the basis of Art. 7(1) CISG respectively,
especially with regard to the promotion of uniformity in the application of the
CISG),18 even if that would result in an open conflict with diverging
views—in particular the American rule—but also with other rules for
calculating damages in domestic procedural laws.19  European courts have
occasionally thus held.20  At first glance the points made above and also
emphasized by Judge Posner regarding the one-sidedness of reimbursement
for litigation costs speak against such an understanding or such an
interpretation of Art. 74 CISG in particular, since reimbursement can only be
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff.21  One should not respond to this with the
presumption, possible through German interpretation methods, of a
counterclaim for damages on the part of the successful defendant due to
breach of a contractual duty of loyalty.  Also, the possibility that claims for
litigation costs or other legal costs asserted in recourse proceedings [against
the original contracting party] are reimbursable as damages22 cannot fully
dispel the argument of the one-sidedness for the core range of cases, and at
most demonstrates a further coincidence concerning reimbursement of legal
costs.  In my opinion, the argument emphasized by Posner regarding the lack
of intent to ratify the Convention on the part of the national legislators who
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signed it into law carries great weight.  Certainly, one cannot always allow
further development in conformity with Art. 7(1) CISG and gap-filling
through uniform rules according to Art. 7(2) CISG to fail simply because the
national legislators did not foresee something and consequently did not
consider it in ratification, since in the main the ratifying or authorizing
national organs did not consciously evaluate the details of the CISG in full
knowledge of their meaning and consequences anyway.  But with such deeply-
rooted rules of domestic law such as the American rule, the argument that the
United States would not have ratified the Convention if the consequence of
abandoning of the American rule in international cases was openly addressed
carries significant weight.  Therefore, it is important not to lose sight of the
practical consequences of the plausible notion that legal costs are or can be
losses for the successful plaintiff.  Yet, since this point [that reimbursement
of costs is not available] can be considered as established in American
jurisprudence,23 it is unlikely that American courts would in the future follow
a different academic opinion, however convincingly reasoned it might be.
Maintaining such a different opinion (i.e., holding “litigation costs as special
damages” to be reimbursable under Art. 74 CISG) in the hopes of influencing
the American courts would be like trying to wag the dog with the tail, or even
with just the fur of the tail; consequently it should no longer be earnestly
asserted or followed.
III.  PARTY DECISIONS AND COST RISKS
1.  The view that the allocation of legal costs is a damages law question
seems to invite application of the damages norms of the CISG to these costs
and thereby create an unavoidable conflict with the American rule.  In my
opinion though, this can be reconciled with the damages provisions of the
CISG in such a way that a collision is avoided:  the decision on this issue
should, in my opinion, ultimately be made by the market (see para. 2 below).
A principle of the CISG underlying the rules of responsibility for breach
of contract is the principle (expressed in various provisions) of the assumption
of risks which at the time of the conclusion of the contract were foreseen or
reasonably should have been foreseen.  This applies for judging whether a
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breach of contract was a fundamental breach or not under Art. 25 CISG, for
the counter-exception to an obligor’s exemption of liability for a failure to
perform due to an impediment beyond his control under Art. 79(1) CISG,24
and particularly for the extent of permitted damages under Art. 74 CISG,
second sentence.  Whoever enters into a contract in the face of known or
recognizable risks that could cause him financial losses and fails nonetheless
to limit or disclaim these risks through appropriate provisions in the contract,
bears them himself.  For compensable losses this applies not only for the
extent of the damages foreseeable as a possible consequence of the breaching
party’s own breach, but also, in my opinion, for certain damages being not
recognized as compensable or not available in certain countries, to the
detriment of the obligee.  In other words, whoever brings or is drawn into
contract disputes before an American court thereby assumes the risk of having
to bear his own legal costs (court costs and attorneys’ fees) according to the
American rule, regardless of the outcome of the legal dispute.25  The parties
may attempt to control this risk through clauses on cost-bearing in the
contract.  In particular they should contemplate avoiding the American rule
through the use of choice of forum clauses that lead to jurisdictions with
procedural rules allowing broad reimbursement of costs, or through the choice
of arbitration proceedings whose rules provide for, or at least allow, cost
allocation.26
2.  Dispute resolution is offered as a service by various institutions—
state-run courts, arbitration organizations, and mediators—which are in
competition.  Indeed, on the international level arbitration institutions, which
compete among themselves and with state-run courts, offer to render such
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services in many countries, in particular for disputes arising from international
contracts.  Insofar as there is freedom of contract for dispute resolution
agreements—which for international commercial contracts in the largest
trading nations is (still) mostly the case—the parties can also choose their cost
regime and thereby also decide whether, through jurisdiction or arbitration
clauses, they wish to avoid application of the American rule for their contract
disputes.27  Therefore, on a fairly long-term basis this market could and should
also decide which cost-bearing rule contracting parties in international
commerce esteem “correct.”28
Contractual arrangements for dispute resolution, and thus also for the
allocation of potential costs, naturally require the collaboration of the other
party, which will not always be attainable, especially so long as and to the
extent there is no transparency with regard to costs and their allocation (i.e.,
with regard to the conditions of the market for these services).  Moreover,
ingrained convictions as to the superiority of one’s own system of dispute
resolution or even just the greater familiarity with its rules may relativize the
significance of consequences that follow possible cost allocations.
Nonetheless, it is hoped that the market gives hints as to which rule is actually
economically more efficient for individual parties and for that reason at least,
“more correct.”  A certain dogmatic preconception of damages in the CISG
should at any rate not prevent that.
